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Bound to Lose! The Tea Party and Pro-Köln

Right-Wing Populist Reactions to Mosque Construction:

A comparative Analysis

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Right-Wing Populist Reactions to Mosque Construction. A comparative analysis

NOAH TELSON

Mit Hinweis darauf, dass sich rechts-populistische Bewegungen immer mehr in der westlichen Welt verbreiten, ist eine Neubewertung des extrem rechten politischen Denkens und der Bereitschaft in der Bevölkerung dies zu unterstützen angesagt. Dies is besonders notwendig aufgrund der Flut des kürzlichen Tea Party-esquen Aktivismus in Nordamerika, in Form der unverhohlenen Verehrung für die von 'Menschen angeführten' pro Markt Revolution und der so genannten "Minutemen" Miliz, und die umfassende Kommunikation und Zusammenarbeit zwischen den verschiedenen rechtsextremen Bewegungen in den europäischen Nationen, bis hin zu den jüngsten Gräueltaten in Norwegen. Dieses Papier stellt einen wichtigen Schritt auf dem Weg dar, die Probleme bezüglich rechts-populistischer Tendenzen der heutigen Zeit zu addressieren, vor allem im sozialen Bereich, wo viele Menschen Gefahr laufen, von diesen Bewegungen stark ausgegrenzt zu werden. Durch die vergleichende Analyse wirft diese Untersuchung einen Blick auf zwei rechts-populistische Bewegungen: die Tea Party in den USA und Pro-Köln in Deutschland und wie sie sich in einer Reihe von Variablen unterscheiden, auch wenn ihre Anforderungen an die Gesellschaft sehr ähnlich sind.

Stichworte: Populismus, Moschee, Pro-Köln, Tea-Party

With evidence that right-wing populist movements are becoming increasingly more widespread throughout the Western world, a reevaluation of far-right political thought and their propensity for popular support is in order. This is particularly necessary given the spate of recent Tea Party-esqe 'activism' throughout North America, in the form of unabashed reverence for 'people-led' pro market revolution and so called 'minutemen' militia, and the extensive communication and cooperation between the various far-right movements throughout the European nations, capped by the recent atrocities in Norway. This paper shall provide an important stepping stone into addressing the very real problems concerning rightwing populist trends of today, particularly in the social realm, where many people run the risk of being severely marginalized by these movements. Through comparative analysis, this exploration takes a look at two right-wing populist movements, The Tea Party in America and Pro-Köln in Germany, and how they differ in a range of variables, even though their demands on society are very similar.

Keywords: Populism, Mosque, Pro-Köln, Tea-Party

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List of Abbreviations

ABC	American Broadcasting Company
AFP	Americans For Prosperity
AT&T	American Telephone and Telegraph
CDU	Christian Democratic Union (Christlich-Demokratische Union)
CNN	Cable News Network
DITIB	Turkish Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (Türkisch-Islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion - Diyanet İşleri Türk-İslam Birligi)
FDP	Free Democratic Party (Freie Demokratische Partei)
FPÖ	Austrian Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs)
FW	KBB Free Voters - League of Cologne Citizens (Freien Wähler–Köln Bürger Bündnis)
GOP	Grand Old Party
MBR	Mobile Counseling against Right-wing Extremism (Mobile Beratung gegen Rechtsextermismus)
NBC	National Broadcasting Company
NPD	National Democratic Party of Germany (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands)
OCDB	Our Country Deserves Better
PAC	Political Action Committee
Pro-NRW	North Rhein-Westphalia (Nordrhein-Westfalen)
SB1070	Senate Bill 1070, Arizona
SDT	Social Disintegration Theory
SPD	Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands)
TARP	Trouble Asset Relief Program
TPN	Tea Party Nation
TPP	Tea Party Patriots

Introduction

I'm gonna tell you fascists
You may be surprised
The people in this world
Are getting organized
You're bound to lose
You fascists bound to lose

Woody Guthrie

In 2008, shortly after the election of President Obama, a curious movement began attracting national attention: So-called grassroots groups of concerned citizens banned together in various regions, collectively calling themselves the 'Tea Party'. Initially fueled by the overhaul of the healthcare system in the US, these apparent 'average Joe' Americans grew increasingly in popularity and in scope. While their main concerns were aimed at controlling fiscal spending and limiting 'big government', some Tea Party members began expanding the list of grievances to include more social concerns. Espousing worries of what they considered the destruction of 'Christian social values', the Tea Party also began to lead the charge against the 'Islamization' of America. They became vocal dissidents of Muslim presence in the country, and began campaigns to cleanse the nation of perceived Islamic threats, like mosque construction (Goodstein, 2010; Hernandez 2010; Hutchinson 2010; Rehab 2010; Vogel 2010; Wheaton 2010; Williams 2011).

When mainstream news outlets began reporting, in the summer of 2010, plans to construct a Muslim community center in downtown Manhattan, two blocks from where the World Trade Center once stood, the Tea Party rhetoric kicked into overdrive, slating the event as an attempt by Muslims to demonstrate a 'victorious invasion' (Goodstein 2010). Indeed, as the decision was made to clear the way for the construction at a final city commission meeting, "[…] several members of the audience shouted "Shame on you!" and "Disgrace!" One woman carried a sign reading, "Don't Glorify Murders of 3,000; No 9/11 Victory Mosque"" (Hernandez 2010). Much of the headlines of the summer were swamped with similar accounts of anti-Islamic rhetoric. The campaign, although unsuccessful in halting construction, preceded the biggest breakthrough for the Tea Party since its inception; Tea Party backed Republicans won a remarkable amount of seats in that year's election, suggesting for many that the Tea Party rhetoric was resonating with people (Carson/ Pettigrew 2011: 14; Karpowitz/ Monson/ Patterson/ Pope 2011: 308).

Two years earlier, across the Atlantic, a similar trend was emerging in the strongest economic power in Europe. News had spread that the Romanic city of Cologne, in the western part of the country, had just approved plans for the construction of what would be the largest mosque in Germany. In the city, whose idyllic skyline features the Catholic cathedral Dom, a small group of concerned citizens formed to combat what they, too, saw as the destruction of western values through the presence of Islam. This group would call themselves Pro-Köln, and would organize protests that would also soon grow in size. Pro-Köln generated enough support to begin expanding and eventually transformed into a larger regional movement, Pro-NRW (Nordrhein-Westfalen), and even further, to encompass all of Germany under the title: Pro-Deutschland. On May 7, 2011, Pro-Köln, with support from similar movements in neighboring countries like Vlaams Belang of Belgium, FPÖ of Austria, and Bloc Identitaire of France, held a rally, "Marsch für die Freiheit" in Cologne, to shore up support against 'creeping Islamization' (Rose 2011). This rapid expansion may be evidence that, 'Islamization' is a real concern for a growing amount of citizens in Europe, particularly in Germany (Pew Research Center 2005: 1).

Despite this rise, Pro-Köln has only experienced minimal success when compared to that of the Tea Party. While Pro-Köln is a growing force, it does not enjoy nearly as much support in the electorate as the Tea Party does. Whereas between 27 and 32 percent of overall voters identifying with the Tea Party in the national midterm elections (Colombant 2010), Pro-Köln's electoral success is so far limited to a small percentage of the vote (5.4%) to the Cologne City Council (Deutsche Welle 2008; Kölner Statistische Nachrichten 2009). Considering that a particular brand of right-wing movements, that include anti-Islamization as a major part of their platform, have increased in numbers throughout the western world, what accounts for the difference in the impact between countries, particularly when the topics and issues they address are similar? In short, why does the Tea Party's message seem to resonate louder with Americans than that of the Pro-Köln message with the German population?

In general, this thesis will attempt to answer these questions by applying a 'most-different' design to comparatively analyze these movements as right-wing populist movements. Both movements are identified as such by the definition provided by Albertazzi and McDonnell, who argue that populism is, "an ideology which pits a virtuous and homogeneous people against a set of elites and dangerous 'others' who

are together depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity and voice" (Albertazzi/ McDonnell 2008: 3). It is quite evident that the rhetoric espoused by both movements supports this definition. Both Tea Party and Pro-Köln locate (some, if not all of) their struggle against the presence of Muslims (the 'dangerous others'), who are 'depriving' them of their 'identity' (Pro-Köln 2009b; Rehab 2010: 3) As outlined, this thesis will exclusively examine the Tea Party movement in the United States and the Pro-Köln/NRW/Deutschland movement in Germany and how they make very similar demands on their society in very similar contexts with divergent outcomes. This context, for the ease of comparison, is restricted to the reaction these movements have toward the construction of Muslim mosques and prayer houses, particularly on Park51 in Manhattan and the Zentralmoschee Köln in Cologne, respectively. It will attempt to shed light on how these two movements, fighting for the preservation of their conception of 'western culture', lead the charge against Islamic presence in western nations, yet ultimately end up with differing results.

As was expressed earlier and will be further examined later, the Tea Party is by all accounts more successful than Pro-Köln, despite having nearly all the same demands. According to literature on populist phenomena the following are ideal locations for examination when attempting to extract differences among populist movements:

(1) the social background from which populist parties emerge;

(2) their ideological characteristics;

(3) their organizational forms and the techniques deployed to appeal to voters […] (Decker 2008: 121)

By examining these areas, this thesis will ultimately show how, even though analogous archetypes of right-wing populist movements emerge in differing societies, they may ultimately share little else in common because of peculiarities in their respective countries. In doing so, this exercise will parse out the numerous differences between the two cases, laying bare independent variables that will explain how the right-wing populist anti-Islamic rhetoric succeeds in garnering support in the face of mosque construction (the Tea Party) and how it does not (Pro-Köln). The various qualitative indicators that will be examined in this exploration include: media representation, quality of leadership and the capabilities of that agency, political structuring and the

ease at which creating new political formations can happen within governmental structures and within society, and, lastly, the role of historical conditions (Albertazzi/ McDonnell 2008: 10). These variables will illuminate in the end the main conditions in which these movements can either be successful or not.

It is necessary to bear in mind that neither movement has achieved its stated aim at preventing mosques from being built, and are not considered 'successful' by this measure. In this case, 'success' is not a quantitative measurement of 'mosque construction prevention', but rather a qualitative approach that looks at how the movements have faired in the advent of their anti-Islamic/anti-mosque campaigns. It will examine success through the various indicators mentioned above, arguing that a populist movement is successful (or, at least more successful than others) when it is favorably considered by these indicators. For example, a right-wing populist movement can be considered more successful if its leadership possesses important assets such as charisma and public access than a movement whose leadership lacks these certain resources that aid favorable exposure. By undertaking this examination, this thesis will provide a deeper understanding of how populism (particularly right-wing populism) thrives in today's political climate.

This thesis is structured into four major chapters. The first chapter provides a categorization of populist movements and how they arise in society. Here, a deeper analysis into populism theory will concentrate on the organizational and relational aspects of populist movements and will ultimately allow us to categorize these particular movements as right-wing populist movements. The objective is not so much how to explain these movements, but rather identifying characteristics which define them as such. Accompanying this more concrete analytical research will be a general reflection into the sociological perspective on theories that help us understand the anti-immigrant behavior of right-wing populism. This includes theories on xenophobic, anti-Islamic, and Islamophobic comportment within society, as well as social integration and disintegration theories to help explain how and why these feelings are expressed in political action and how these movements gain support from certain sections within society.

The second chapter focuses primarily on the organization of the movements in question. An in-depth look into the particular Tea Party and Pro-Köln movements clarifies how these movements can be categorized as right-wing populist movements

and also locates certain characteristics within the two movements that make them appropriate for such a comparison. Concomitantly, it also addresses problems that might arise in such a comparison. This section chronicles the genesis of each movement, carefully illustrating the differing political environments from which they arose and how their ideologies are informed by this history. Additionally, the organizational structures are examined in fuller detail, showing how the internal organization of a movement is necessary in such an analysis.

A case study on mosque construction follows this analysis. An analysis into the actual planning and construction of the mosques (Park51 and the Zentralmoschee Köln) brings to light the particular context in which these populist movements generate a following. By examining this process, certain developmental peculiarities are identified that help to explain the right-wing populist reaction. This chapter carefully examines the background of each mosque's establishment, the debates surrounding the planning, both pro and con, an analysis in to the decision making process and an explanation of those specific results.

In the fourth chapter, an overarching analysis into what each movement gained out of the mosque issue is considered. Here, the manner in which movements struggle for public awareness is reviewed, addressing more societal perspectives, including: how movements are perceived vis-á-vis media representation, the quality of each movement's agency including the capability of leadership, their political maneuverability or how easy it is for these movements to organize within the political and societal structures, and lastly, how historical conditions play a role in the existence of right-wing populist movements. These measurements help elucidate the differences in outcome from the two mosque cases and ultimately clarify what conditions promote a more robust movement.

In the final chapter, an examination of the preceding work as a whole draws some conclusions on the nature of right-wing populism in today's political and cultural climate and shall attempt to apply individual meaning in the respective countries. It illuminates the peculiar case of why and how these populist movements stand out from the movements of the past, and expectantly shows how the presence of Islam is perceived as the latest "dangerous 'others'" who are threatening the very essence of 'western culture'.

1. Categorizing Populist Movements: A Theoretical Framework

Populism, in all its forms, arises out of certain political and societal conditions that have been closely studied by social and political scientists for years. The multitude of forms populism takes are endless and are routinely challenged and amended by newer conceptions and definitions. From the classical studies of Latin American populism, to the nationalistic studies of a more violent Palestinian populism, to the contemporary studies of Western Europe's working-class populism struggling with globalization and deindustrialization, populism remains an ever-allusive concept and exists on many political levels (McGuigan 2005: 180). Indeed, many researchers on the topic are reticent to make sweeping claims, realizing that in every country, populist manifestations are unique (Albertazzi/ McDonnell 2008: 7) and it would do better to understand, first, the 'analytical core' so that we can approach populism in such way that allows us to be critical of assumptions, rather than simply summarizing peculiarities in each conception (Panizza 2005: 2). However, all forms of discussed populism do share certain characteristics born from a distinct distrust in the established democratic rule. From this we can approximate a working definition that will serve as an umbrella term to encompass all other variations. As Frank Decker stresses, for a term to be meaningfully applied, "it must be chronologically, spatially and materially restricted" (Decker 2008: 122). In doing so, Decker offers the term 'new right-wing populism' as a way to more fully explain the rash of right-wing populist movements in Europe over the past half-century, notably those gaining their highest popularity in the 90s. This term, however, is rapidly becoming less sufficient in describing the brand of far-right populism that is evident today. For Decker, this concept encapsulated a particular trend of right-wing populism that was largely characterized by failure; failure to overcome historical encumbrances, failure to produce charismatic leadership, and failure to enter into any meaningful arena of political action, among others. One cannot necessarily make the same judgment for the far-right movements we see today, simply because they are less marred by those failures. In this chapter, therefore, while defining populism as a broad concept, I specifically discuss how right-wing populism, particularly of the past 5 years, is further defined as a variation of this broader concept. In doing so, I put forth a new term to more adequately explain these movements according to a temporal, spatial, and

material specificity, 'post-neo right-wing populism'. This term better positions movements like Pro-Köln, Vlaams Belang, FPÖ and company in relation to their earlier formations, and connotes a possible and worrisome sea change in right-wing popularity. This concept will be discussed in the conclusion of this thesis.

To begin, populism can be generally described as a political philosophy, most easily characterized by the claim that it has the voice of the people within a democratic system that is controlled by an elite force (Eatwell 2004: 11). These claims become vocal or public when perceived threats to 'genuine' democracy are recognized (Albertazzi/ McDonnell 2008: 4; Hans-George Betz 2001: 2; Hans-Georg Betz 2004: 7; Canovan 1999: 3; McGuigan 2005: 180; Panizza 2005: 1). These calls for a reevaluation of democracy under 'threat' are common place for any democracy that locates the root of power in the hands of the people but does not provide a sufficient arena for democratic debate (Mouffe 2002: 1; 2005: 51). How far these calls for restoration of power foment and become a destabilizing force within the political structures or are simply addressed within public discourse by those in power, however, is an important distinction. It speaks to the quality of a democratic institution that is able to account for the demands of populist parties whilst remaining stable. Evidence of a failure to comfortably meet the demands of populist parties while remaining stable in the face of opposition is seen throughout Latin America, most notably with the archetypal populist Juan Perón in Argentina, where Peronism left a legacy of terror and fascistic tendencies. More commonly, though, populist rhetoric is addressed publicly and thoroughly in political and democratic discussion, effectively preventing any fomentation of revolutionary sentiment.

Another important distinction of populism is that it exists beyond the descriptive restrictions of the political spectrum. While specific cases of populism do tend to follow an unmistakable political flavor, populism itself cannot be labeled as such; it is neither left-driven nor right-driven. The characteristics of populism are broad measures that specific political groups, movements, and leaders fall under, whether they are left or right of the spectrum. Populism is thus understood best as a "style" as opposed to a particular brand of ideology (Eatwell 2004: 12). Indeed, many populists, though they clearly emerge from a certain political bent, claim they are neither left not right but rather speak for the 'people' (Canovan 1999: 5). For this reason, it is necessary, as Decker argues, to restrict specific populist terms for them to be "meaningful" and

indeed left-wing, centrist, and right-wing populism are all very different from one another.

1.1 Right-Wing Populism

The question that follows naturally, then, is what makes a populist movement specifically couched in the political spectrum? What characteristics distinguish one populist movement from another and who, within society, ultimately supports them? To tackle these questions it is first necessary to understand that while populism speaks to the tactics of a movement, political affiliations are reflections of the ideology espoused by that movement. For the most part, clear delineations can be made between left- and right-leaning populist movements even though they all seem to be born from the similar political climate, claiming to be the voice of the common citizen. For Decker, ideology makes a world of difference in explaining populist parties, and is susceptible to specific conditions within the framework of the movement. He argues that one such condition lies in the way a populist movement will define for its followers a meaning of an egalitarian society, "The characteristic features of the political substance of populism are a precarious synthesis of the cult of the individual and collectivism and an 'ambivalent' interpretation of equality" (Decker 2008: 123, italics mine). For contemporary right-wing movements, an interpretation of equality is always expressed in terms of nativist rhetoric that rails against the leftist claims of multiculturalism. Indeed, for Van Der Brug et al, right-wing populist parties are synonymous with anti-immigrant parties (Van Der Brug et. al. 2005: 537).

While the crux of the right-wing rendering of a fair and equal society is couched in anti-foreignization, it stems from traditional liberalism in that these movements, "[advance] the notion of "rights" - "rights of ethnic people, rights to a culture," but also the right to individual safety, which address "deepseated [sic] and understandable fears about the erosion of identity and tradition by the globalizing (but only partially homogenizing) forces of modernity"" (Roger Griffin as cited in Hans-George Betz 2001: 10).

While, the general characteristic of right-wing populism revolves primarily around politics of exclusion, the manifestation of those politics also leads to further categorization of various right-wing populist movements. Roger Eatwell explains that in academia, many terms are used haphazardly to describe a plentitude of different groups on the right (Eatwell 2004: 5). In particular, the term 'radical right' and

'extreme right' are used interchangeably, when in fact there are fundamental differences that are often unacknowledged. Additionally, there are a multitude of criteria that exists in the literature, all which claim to define 'extreme' best (Mudde 1996). For Eatwell, the most cogent argument for the difference between the two is made by German law, which locates the distinction in the relationship these movements or groups have with the established democracy. For radical groups, there is mere opposition toward certain aspects of the Constitution while extremist groups are outwardly hostile towards it (Eatwell 2004: 7; Hainsworth 2008: 9).

In Eatwell's clarification however, neither the radical nor the extreme definitions neatly apply to Pro-Köln or the Tea Party. In fact both groups use their Constitution as core tools to support their respective ideology. Many Tea Party activists claim they are strict 'constitutionalists' claiming that America has strayed from the Constitution and they are simply fighting to restore it. Restoring constitutional values is also the trademark of many Tea Party campaigns (Rosen 2010), particularly that of Ron Paul, whose tireless presidential bids are bent on strict constitutionalism. For Pro-Köln, a similar claim is made that the movement is made up of, "democratic patriots, strictly defending [the German] constitution and the freedom of speech and meaning" (Bodissey 2009a). Additionally, the concept of 'extreme' as opposed to 'radical' was often associated with anti-semitic sentiment and violent proclivities (Eatwell 2004: 8), which certainly does not help to explain why some might consider the Tea Party and Pro-Köln 'extreme right-wing groups'. Both movements openly support Israel and show no real sign of classic antisemitism, as is evident in the Tea Party Caucus' actions, including a resolution to endorse an Israeli offensive against Iran (House Resolution 1553 2010) and Pro-Köln's continuous parading of its Jewish membership and solidarity with Israel (Bodissey 2009a; Sheik Yer' Mami 2008: 21). Nor are these groups supportive of violence, at least not publicly. Pro-Köln is quick to respond to what they claim are the violent acts of the left against Pro-Köln in particular (Landen 2008; Sheik Yer' Mami 2008: 21) and in America, there is an ongoing discourse on the use of 'violent' language, of which the left accuse the right, particularly the Tea Party, of abusing and vice versa[1].

1 This is particularly evident with the Left's attack on House Representative Allen West's comments about arming the people for revolution and Sarah Palin's 'cross hairs' imagery which was associated with the shooting of Representative Gabrielle Giffords and the Right's attack on Rev. Wright's "goddamn America" sermon and Teamsters Union

However limited by language we may be, academics still concede room for 'extreme' labeling for those who are not outwardly violent or anti-semitic. Eatwell acknowledges the fact that, of late, attempts to define the 'extreme right' have dropped violence as a necessary characteristic. While it is still very much a feature of those groups on the fringe, there is room for vocally non-violent groups on the right in the 'extreme' family, because of their rigidly held beliefs expressed through exclusionary rhetoric transmitted through nationalism and racism[2] (Eatwell 2000, 2004; Hainsworth 2008; Mudde 1996). While this is certainly not a guideline by which countries (particularly Germany) categorize right-wing movements, it allows for us to better understand where such groups lie in an increasingly clouded political spectrum.

In addition to nationalism and racism, academics include 'anti-democracy' and a desire for a 'strong state' as features of the 'extreme right'. While Eatwell admits that anti-democracy is a problematic term, "[...] given the obvious reasons in the contemporary West to hide anti-democratic sentiments" (Eatwell 2004: 8), I argue that desires for a strong state is equally difficult to substantiate. Certainly, these arguments involve numerous hours of decoding political rhetoric to avoid subjective results, particularly, as Eatwell suggests, when expressing anti-democratic ideals in the West is tantamount to political suicide. To be sure, to claim that the Tea Party holds anti-democratic feelings is to endeavor into a precarious playing field of intransigent terminology where threats of slander and libel are always lurking. However, when Tea Party rhetoric often inspires inherently anti-democratic actions, such as armed resistance and the authoring of exclusionary legislation[3] then is it fair to label the Tea Party, at least its fringe elements, as anti-democratic. In the same vein, claiming the Tea Party advocates a strong state is complicated, especially when their slogans so often rail against 'big government'. The Tea Party rhetoric against big government, particularly by those 'mainstream' politicians (possibly hardline Republicans usurping the Tea Party label) however, is predominantly directed towards specific government programs

President James Hoffa's 'SOB' remarks. For further discussion see Neiwert, D. (2011). Allen West: 'No Place' for Harsh Rhetoric in Politics. David's Blog. www.crooksandliars.com. Retrieved September 7, 2011

2 In this case, anti-Islamic sentiment.

3 Tea Party members in Arizona have not only organized border patrolling militia, but also inspired the passing of SB1070 signed into law by Tea Party backed Governor Jan Brewer, which is argued to impede on citizens' rights by making it a crime to be in Arizona without legal required documents. See Arizona State Senate. (2010). Senate Bill 1070 and Tea Party Patriots. (2010). United Border Coalition Tea Party. Tea Party Events Retrieved September 12, 2011, from http://www.teapartypatriots.org/EventDetail/6673/mission.aspx.

tackling social issues, although this too is debatable. For instance, Tea Party movements gained immense popularity after relentlessly attacking the Health Care Reform Act signed by President Obama, demonizing the idea that the federal government can dictate to all US citizens not only what kind of healthcare they receive but that they must provide healthcare at all. For the Tea Party, such an action is only morally reprehensible depending on where it falls in the purview of their rigidly held beliefs, which explains why many of them feel a federal ban on same sex marriage is not objectionable, but rather permissible because it reinforces Judeo-Christian values. Additionally, many Tea Partiers (though there is a distinction among the members on how) support the government's role in protecting the rights of corporations. While some were adamant critics of the bailouts in 2007-08, most support the Supreme Court decision on Citizen's United that extended the reach of earlier cases, allowing American corporations to be recognized as citizens, resulting in federal protection of corporations to engage in dubious practices such as unlimited and anonymous electoral contributions to any campaign. Even more, Tea Partiers overwhelmingly reject taxing these corporations, many of whom at the moment pay nothing to the federal government. Given the selective nature by which the Tea Party define government overreach, the banner of small government must be taken with a grain of salt and, consequently, claiming that the Tea Party supports a strong state is also valid on certain issues.

For all intents and purposes, I regard both of these movements as 'extreme', with the understanding that classic conceptions of the term no longer apply. While I do not regularly refer to them as such, I defend the use of the term, particularly in this body of work, as it helps to underscore the focus of the topic at hand: the reactions these movements have with the construction of mosques in 'their neighborhoods'– reactions that are extreme in nature. The label 'extreme' points to the nationalistic tendencies common in populist movements and the racist or, in this case, anti-Islamic disposition both of these movements display. The following chapters on how these populist parties and movements are organized and how specifically they react to the construction of mosques shall reveal in closer detail how the Tea Party and Pro-Köln are deserving of the 'extreme' label. Though the definition is debated ad nauseam, in this limited scope, it serves its purpose well.

1.2 Sociological perspectives

Thus far, we have discussed what makes a populist movement unique and how right-wing movements, particularly those of 'extremist' bent, are distinguished from the plethora of populist movements that exist. However, understanding that right-wing populist movements exist mainly as groups pushing for nativist rights within democracies, that support anti-immigration policy and are often described as nationalistic and racist does little to explain why they exist in society. What political and social anomalies exist that create nativist anti-Islamic sentiment and how are they propagated? To answer this question, one must look to the canon to understand how sociological perspectives on racism (xenophobia and anti-Islamic sentiment) inform our understanding of why these movements hold exclusionary points of view. We must explore the various sociological explanations, not just on how racist ideology is created, but also on how racism is propagated through collective reactions, by groups of people who struggle with contemporary crises of identity in a globalized world.

To help explain these ideas of exclusionary feelings in a modern society on the most basest terms, I turn to the example of National Socialism and its policies. Often, in reflecting on the atrocities of the Holocaust, one is wont to ask how an entire nation was seemingly turned complacent in the active persecution and murder of so many, particularly in this day and age. No answer is complete and no answer is satisfactory, but we know that the Holocaust and modern approximations of the Holocaust are born out of similar trends: trends of economic uncertainties and political disrepair coupled with the anxieties of modernity. Of course this can only be explained within the context of the modern nation-state, and how the idea of nationalism, arbitrarily constructed, readily informs racist actions. As Pnina Werbner explains:

"Although racism and xenophobia are not new phenomena – slavery, ethnic cleansing, pogroms, genocides, all preceded the formation of the modern nation-state – it is impossible to understand modern racism (or, indeed, political ethnicity, ethnic economic competition or identity politics) outside the context of the modem nation-state, conceived of as a sovereign, territorially bounded and self-governing social collectivity. The most destructive and horrific forms of modem racism occur when an ethnic group – either the majority or a militarily powerful minority – captures the state and uses its apparatuses of violence, the police and the army, to attack civilians defined as the 'other'." (Werbner 2005: 6)

In this, Werbner argues that racism, or more specifically, modern day racism and its cohorts, are only understandable in the context of the modern nation-state where certain unique interactions take place that create extreme resentment. As Werbner states, racism and xenophobia have existed long before the nation-state, but these traditional conceptions of cultural and ethnic forms of racism are no longer supported by a modern day nation-state that is arbitrarily formed. Ethnic purity is a myth for much of the world, where nations are composed of a multitude of cultural origins. Racism in today's world is thus partially a result of nation-states that, for whatever reason, cannot cope with the multitudes of ethnic claims.

Of course not all corners of the modern world experience racism to the same extent. Indeed, numerous studies have sought to examine what social conditions create the highest levels of racism. From these studies, various theories have been developed which struggle to locate specific conditions. Many of these theories directly contradict each other, fueling academic battles of differing sociological approaches. Of the most notable are the realistic conflict theories that suggest ethnic groups living among each other tend to have negative attitudes of other races because they are directly competing for limited and scarce resources. Contradicting this claim, the contact theory suggests that the closer ethnic groups are the more positive their attitudes are of each other. This is supported by the idea that the more exposure one has with something or someone the more familiar and comfortable one is or becomes (Kalin 1996: 171-2). For the most part, scholarship supports the 'mere exposure' claim to certain degrees. According to Oliver and Wong, contact theory must be more closely examined:

"Like past research, we find strong evidence that people's racial attitudes are influenced by their racial environments. Yet, unlike much of this research, we find that close proximity to out-groups corresponds with less racial antagonism. Among blacks, Latinos, and whites, as their neighborhoods become more racially diverse, negative stereotypes and competition with other racial groups drop. Negative perceptions of out-groups are higher for those who live in neighborhoods with more of their own racial group." (Oliver/ Wong 2003: 580)

Accordingly, to explain anti-Islamic sentiment among populist groups, particularly in America and Germany, may have to due with the ethnic separation these groups have from one another. In Germany, in particular, parallel gesellshaft is considered a major

hindrance towards the integration and assimilation of immigrants, particularly the Turks. These immigrant 'out-groups' largely live isolated from others, a condition that has existed for almost three generations. Though they exist in what might be considered close proximity, their neighborhoods remain virtually homogenous.

These theories certainly provide insight on racial attitudes, but they help only to locate where these attitudes are more likely to appear. To understand how these feelings are generated in society, one must examine the conditions within certain contexts, particularly those areas where exclusionary points of view are widespread. Social disintegration theory (SDT) is one such theory that imparts invaluable wisdom on the topic.

SDT puts forth answers that explain the tendency of societies to decline or disintegrate over time due to the lack of social welfare or proper social support networks. Heitmeyer and Anhut expand on SDT, to include explanations of violence and antisocial attitudes in society. In this work, however, I have further expanded on Heitmeyer and Anhut's formulation of SDT. In my analysis, SDT naturally explains racism and negative racial attitudes, since they are constitutive antisocial behavior and quite often of violent behavior as well. In this way, we can use SDT to inform us of the conditions that exist in nations where there are higher levels of social segregation, limiting peoples' awareness and openness to others, as contact theories suggest, that demonstrate how and why people resort to exclusionary feelings (based on racist attitudes, including xenophobia, antisemitism or anti-Islamism) and eventually violence. Additionally, SDT examines society beyond economic terms, focusing on social recognition as a linchpin for just society (Heitmeyer/ Anhut 2008: 28). Social recognition is the term put forth, that explains positive conditions within society necessarily derived from social integration or the successful intermingling of people within a given space.

According to Heitmeyer and Anhut, social integration is composed of three specific dimensions:

1. social-structural integration (for example, having a job)
2. institutional integration (for example, voter participation)
3. socioemotional integration (for example, social support by family, friends) (Heitmeyer/ Anhut 2008: 28).

When all of these dimensions are accounted for and provided, social recognition follows necessarily as a consequence. Simply put, social integration produces social recognition. Social recognition suggests that the well-being of society is taken care of and there is less potential for civil unrest. In situations of disintegration, people become increasingly alienated from society, and their reactions can manifest in violence or otherwise. Such situations occur, for example, in periods of high unemployment, where those without work feel pressure from an increasingly individualized system that demands economic security and provides increasingly less state welfare. In such cases, anger is turned to those who are less effected by market volatility, such as the wealthy elites (of which the Tea Party takes specific aim at in their rhetoric of the 'fat-cats' on the top, controlling government) or, in other cases, toward those (immigrants) who are perceived to have 'taken' jobs from those more 'deserving' of them or are 'leaching' the system of welfare that 'belongs' to the 'natives'. In such a sense, when the problem of social-structural integration is unable to be solved, people, or groups of people, may react by forming consensus groups based on exclusionary policies. In other words, these groups become a way for those who have failed to secure economic stability and gain 'success' in an increasingly individualized world, and for those who feel isolated by government policies of immigration to vent their anger. As Heitmeyer and Anhut explain:

"[...] despite the pressure to acquire status, the opportunities and risks of social positioning are spread unevenly. This leads increasingly frequently to disappointment for the losers in the modernization process; it unleashes feelings of resignation, impotence, and rage and causes a lack of positional recognition that undermines self-confidence." (Heitmeyer/ Anhut 2008: 29)

Group formations, which arise from these conditions, like parts of the Tea Party and the entirety of Pro-Köln, are possibilities for people to curb the harm of an "undermined self-confidence". Indeed, 'scapegoating' and other forms of discrimination and prejudices are often an alternative when coping with pressures inflicted by lack of recognition, particularly as a collective form of reaction (Heitmeyer/ Anhut 2008: 35).

The banding together of people in collective reaction to perceived injustices is a phenomenon that is explained by a number of factors. In many cases, particularly in instances where social-structural integration is not solved, racism (in all its forms) is commonplace. However, it is a sense of solidarity (built of dysfunctional ways of

coping) that binds people with these feelings together. This bond held together by common xenophobic and racist feelings can be referred to as nationalism, at least an extreme form of nationalism (Wimmer 1997: 19). It is the initial belief that ones' ethnic origin determines the social and political rights of a nation that is at the core of xenophobic feelings. It is therefore necessary to explore how ideas of ethnicity are formed and then used as tools to promote exclusionary policies.

For Immanuel Wallerstein, the construction of 'peoplehood' is an arbitrary yet intentional phenomenon that aims to position one group of people against another. The classic arguments that defining oneself is an act of defining the 'other' are expanded upon as more specific tactics of ethnic solidarity. In labeling 'races', 'ethnic groups', and 'nations' we are essentially building categories that, "enable us to make claims based upon the past against the manipulable "rational" processes of the present" (Wallerstein 1987: 380). 'Pastness' is an important consideration for Wallerstein because it acts as the incontestable truth of a people, and is therefore used to make broad generalizations about others. The essentialist nature of 'pastness' describes for us how one self-proclaimed ethnic group is able to form prejudiced feelings against another. The 'past' in this sense is used to diminish a certain group, and then re-instituted as a posteriori proof of one group's diminished social standing. Of course 'pastness' is in itself a construct that is often skewed and invented to build up the esteem of a specific group. Wallerstein explains:

"Pastness is a mode by which persons are persuaded to act in the present in ways they might not otherwise act. Pastness is a tool persons use against each other. Pastness is a central element in the socialization of individuals, in the maintenance of group solidarity, in the establishment of or challenge to social legitimation." (Wallerstein 1987: 381)

For these groups, the problems of immigration lie solely in the hands of immigrants who cannot or 'refuse' to integrate into the host society. These hindrances may be explained as 'cultural differentness' and connotes a functionalists claim that foreign culture (particularly Islamic culture) is incompatible with the native born (European) (Wimmer 1997: 22). Of course, functionalism as a respected sociological theory is discarded at once as parochial provocation. 'Pastness', however, though it details the

bigotries of ethnic groups, is an important facet to bear in mind. It reflects on the invented nature of nations and traditions[4], while further drawing on the explicit dangers of such inventions, particularly when the intent is divisive. Then again, divisiveness is the staple of right-wing populist ideology. The very definition of xenophobia (and all forms of racism) necessarily indicates a desire (whether privately or publicly) to keep others separate. The bread and butter of right-wing populism is, similarly, a desire to sell separatist policy in the political arena.

The theories that strive to explain these conditions are numerous and each one important in their own rite. In this reflection, however, a synthesis of many varying theories is endeavored. They first explain individual responses, derived from a lack of social recognition, and later, the manifestation of those responses in the protective formation of like-minded groups. Societies that are highly segregated by neighborhoods for example, may be hotspots for higher levels of negative racial behavior. These people, in segregated neighborhoods or observing other segregated neighborhoods in close proximity, cannot simply be expected to hold prejudiced feelings towards others a priori. Rather, they are further informed by outlying social cues, explained by SDT. This includes the breakdown of social support systems, particularly ones that are destroyed by contemporary formulations of capitalism, that supports individual competition and reinforces inequitable access to status and success. As a defense mechanism, these people react by forming groups of like minded individuals who produce sentiment that is supported by certain techniques, such as Wallerstein's conception of 'pastness' which allows these people to feel vindicated by such views. These sociological perspectives also explain the rash of racism and anti-immigrant sentiment that is sweeping briskly across the West today, suggesting that it is very much a product of contemporary society, built highly on the idea of competition and individualized egocentric attitudes, that continually whither concepts of community and solidarity, the so called, "losers of modernity" (Heitmeyer/ Anhut 2008: 30; Werbner 2005: 6). I apply these theories to the following body of work as guidelines for understanding their presence in contemporary society. This is a discussion with infinite inertia and is perhaps at its highest point of relevance.

4 as Hobsbawm describes cogently as, "deliberate and always innovative" (1983: 13)

2. Right-Wing Populist Organization

The way in which any political institution is organized, whether it is a party or movement, provides indispensable details that one can use to make certain judgements. Particularly in a comparison, each movement must be analyzed from inception. Thus, the particularities of the environment in which these movements were conceived, and in which they now exist, are utilized as ways of evaluating, in this case, how one movement (the Tea Party) has become a noticeable force in American politics, while the other (Pro-Köln) is struggling to even gain mention in mainstream media.

In the following chapter, details of the right-wing populist structures of both the Tea Party and Pro-Köln and how they organize themselves will be dissected.

2.1 The Tea Party

The organizational details of the Tea Party is, to say the least, immensely convoluted. When speaking of the "Tea Party" one is already entering questionable territory. First, the Tea Party is not a 'party' in the political sense. It is rather a movement that has been characterized by traditional conservative values, thereby aligning itself with the more libertarian branch of the Republican party. The Tea Party, does however, endorse candidates and currently has its own caucus in the House of Representatives. Though this caucus is made up entirely of registered Republicans (Bachmann 2010), various. Tea Party groups claim their membership spans all political orientations. Immediately, attempting to categorize the Tea Party into a singular, definable entity is near Sisyphean in exercise.

This task is only further confused by the decentralized structure of the movement. The Tea Party can be seen as a political movement that is stratified vertically and horizontally. Each stratification connotes either a difference in agenda (vertical) or a difference in leadership (horizontally). These divisions in policy and in command, however, do not establish any difference in name. The common parlance refers to any number of differing groups as singularly and ominously as "The Tea Party".

Horizontal division, as mentioned above, refers to the various Tea Party groups that exist in the United States that have different leaders and eventually different supporters. The unrest and discontent with government spending that marked the end of Bush's presidency and marred the beginning of Obama's, unleashed a fury of

dissatisfied citizens that began to look to the budding idea of the "Tea Party" as a place to vent their anger.

In the first months of Tea Party activism, most of the organization was conducted by local Tea Party chapters that had little or no coordination with each other, other than through social media. Indeed, as early Tea Party activist and organizer, John M. O'Hara, writes in his book, A New American Tea Party:

	Freedom Works	Our Country Deserves Better	Tea Party Nation	The Tea Party Patriots	Americans For Prosperity
	Dick Armey	Howard Kaloogian	Judson Phillips	Mark Meckler	David H. Koch
	Less government regulation of business and lower taxes	Lowering taxes, opposition to bailouts, strong national defense, secure borders, sounds energy policy, and judges who "respect the constitution."	Limited government, free speech, the 2nd amendment, military, and border security	Support and training for "anyone who identifies with the Tea Party Movement"	Repealing the Affordable Healthcare Bill, and fighting the institution of the cap-and-trade program
	Advocacy through lobbying	Political Action Committee (PAC)	Funding as a for-profit group	Funding through donations	Funding through Koch Industries

Figure 1: Rasmussen, S., & Schoen, D. (2010)

"The idea was to have a "tea party." There were already vague rumblings among the center-right grassroots and think tank communities about staging an event on the Fourth of July. [...] Already Facebook groups were multiplying, each carrying in its description iterations of the phrase [...] "Tea Party!" (O'Hara 2010: 5).

The culmination of these emerging sentiments was a nation-wide protest that reportedly took place in 48 different places, "from St. Louis to San Antonio to Chicago" on February 27th, 2009 (Berger 2009). The effects of which saw a reemergence of right-wing political enthusiasm, non-stop media coverage, and the adjuration to publish accounts of Tea Party glory (like O'Hara's) that give the Tea Party movement a permanent place on the mantle of American history. The February 27th event no doubt thrust certain Tea Party ideals into the mainstream discussion, however, nearly three years later, the message of these original 'tea parties' has become quite muddled by 'astro-turfing'[5] and by questionable social policies. This is not to say that its support is waining, in fact the Tea Party has established itself as a contender in the political field and has presented itself as a major challenger to the Republican Party (Karpowitz et al. 2011: 308).

Impossible to chronicle in this thesis, is the eventual shift from the grassroots organization of conservative activists taking issue with corporate bailouts, high taxes, and a general turn away from laissez-faire capitalism to the fundamentally established elite control of Tea Party organization and the inflammation of exclusionary principles that commonly blemishes the Tea Party appearance. Shortly after Tea Party protests began to gain traction in the media, many conservative political players positioned themselves favorably in the movement's name. Overnight, what were once bungling politicians, were now newly revived Tea Party enthusiasts, speaking to the heart of America. For instance, John Boehner of Ohio, a Republican representative, quickly capitalized on the new wave of anti-Washington sentiment, though he has been there for years himself. He now sits as the speaker of the House. Additionally, former House majority leader, Dick Armey has asserted himself as a major player in the right-wing protest movement by running FreedomWorks (see Figure 1.), an organization that

5 A term used to describe so called 'grassroots' movements that not only receive support from mainstream or well funded sources but are created by them. See Ashbee, E. (2011). Bewitched – The Tea Party Movement: Ideas, Interests and Institutions. Political Quarterly, 82(2), 157-164, Rasmussen, S., & Schoen, D. (2010). Mad As Hell: How the Tea Party Movement Is Fundamentally Remaking Our Two-Party System New York: HarperCollins e-books. (274).

helps organize various Tea Party movements throughout the nation, funding their activism and essentially guiding their ideology (Rasmussen/ Schoen 2010: 146). According to watchdog groups Media Matters for America and Common Cause, FreedomWorks receives donations from such corporations as Verizon and AT&T, Exxon Mobil, the Koch Brothers, and has close connections with lobbying firms in Washington (Common Cause 2006: 7; Media Matters Action Network 2011). Such details provide an interesting layer to the idea of Tea Party 'anti-establishment' since it is precisely the establishment that corners much of their leadership and consequently their ideology. It is this differentiation between small town Tea Party groups who express legitimate concerns about government spending, and the 'astroturfed' movements that receive financial support from dubious sources and positive mainstream media coverage[6] delineating clear hierarchical relationships that illustrates horizontal stratification.

Vertical stratification reflects more on the ideological differences that are at once perceivable in the Tea Party. This describes the more libertarian side, that concern themselves mostly with free-market principles and issues of the economy, while others in the movement find a message of homeland protection, the need to promote social policies that exclude foreigners from 'a piece of the pie'. For the left, indiscriminate labeling of the Tea Party, as a whole, as 'racist' is a commonplace occurrence. Indeed, critics of the Tea Party locate most of their condemnation in the movement's rather extreme social views, particularly regarding Islam. While much of this rhetoric may be unmerited, it is born from certain conditions that deserves a closer look[7].

Though the differing agendas among the multitude of Tea Party groups are varied, they do fall under an umbrella of core strict 'constitutional' values. These guiding principles are used as the Tea Party's ideological mainstay. In fact, whether it is the commitment to limited government, distrust of political elite, or the concern that the 'undeserved' are benefitting from the system, they all harken back to this limited understanding of the founding of America and of deep faith in the market (Ashbee 2011: 158-9).

6 Media coverage of the Tea Party has been mostly the benchmark of FOX News. However, other news agencies have also depicted the Tea Party quite favorably, such as CNN, made evident as recently as their joint hosting of Republican presidential debate with what they referred to as the "first ever Tea Party debate". See CNN. (2011). CNN, Tea Party Express to Host First-Ever Tea Party Debate, Sept. 12. CNN Press Room. Cable News Network. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. Retrieved September 12, 2011, from http://cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/2011/09/08/cnn-tea-party-express-to-host-first-ever-tea-party-debate-sept-12/

7 A more thorough analysis of this will come in the next chapter.

Particularly interesting in the scope of this thesis, is how the Tea Party frames social policies within the context of these underlying values. By and large, these values are positioned as market oriented 'logic', which reasons that regardless of specific situations, government protectionism is condemnable, made expressly evident in light of the recent bailouts (Ashbee 2011: 185; O'Hara 2010: 4; Rasmussen/ Schoen 2010: 120). The fundamental objection is that the State assists those who are seen as unbefitting. On one hand, this idea is transmitted to those economic terms where financial bailouts were delivered to those who were 'undeserving' (banks), and, on the other hand, to social terms where state welfare resources are delivered to those who are 'undeserving' (foreigners). In this light, what are seemingly racist policies are masked by strict dogmatism of the market, coupled with a rather extreme nationalist understanding of society. The freedom of the market should be protected by the government while benefit of the market should be reaped by those who are 'deserving'.

What, then, of the functionality of the Tea Party? We understand that it exists in a myriad of ways, both ideologically and structurally, but how does its arrangement keep itself relevant in the American political playing field? There are several explanations: most notably, the Tea Party was able to capitalize on certain institutional openings that were created in the wake of the bank bailouts and the creation of TARP[8]. The dissatisfaction of these policies led to massive voter turnout in senatorial and house elections that swept in Tea Party candidates, ousting "more mainstream contenders", particularly long established Republicans (Ashbee, 2011; pp. 161). Additionally, as Ashbee clarifies:

"[...] the advent of new technology, social networking sites and highly partisan forms of broadcasting have changed the opportunity cost ratios associated with campaigning and mobilisation processes, thereby opening up possibilities even for organisations with initially limited resources (Ashbee 2011: 160)."

With their foot in the door, the Tea Party has been able to remain vocal on many issues, owing their success to support from popular media and actual democratic exercises that afforded them seats in the processes of government.

8 Troubled Asset Relief Program, signed into law by President George W. Bush which allowed the government to buy assets and equity from failing financial institutions.

Ashbee, however, argues that the Tea Party movement runs in 'contestation' with the established rule of the Republican Party and therefore may have little chance of survival. As made evident by established Republican caucus' shooting down certain policy pledges put forth by the Tea Party, suggests that the Tea Party has little political weight to throw around, and is still very much under the command of the GOP (Ashbee 2011: 161-2). This very situation, however, in combination with the latest Tea Party mobilization tactics, suggests that their is more unity with the Republicans than threat of the Tea Party's dissipation. With the presidential campaign in particular, all Republican candidates are appealing to Tea Party ideals. Of course the idea of unity between the two is used limitedly. Since it is clear that much the Tea Party is being funded ('astroturfed') by recognized GOP facets, and that once prominent GOP members are now suddenly Tea Party heroes, it is fair to say that the popular image of the Tea Party has been effectively expropriated by the established Republican party as a 'rebranding' and effective way to reinvigorate their base.

2.2 Pro-Köln

In Germany, right-wing populism is more easily traceable, particularly in light of the Tea Party's hard to define nature. Pro-Köln is one such case whose path from obscurity



Figure 2: Kölnische Statistische Nachrichten

to national attention follows more traditional populist indicators. While they cannot be considered wholly successful, it is clear that their tactics, and indeed their failures, are typical of populist movements throughout Europe.

Pro-Köln first began in 1996 as a small cohort of people in Cologne sharing similar sentiment against the presence of Islam in Germany. However, the group did not fully gain traction until 2004, when they began to organize protests against a Muslim culture center and mosque that was being planned for construction. Through somewhat successful canvassing, the local movement grew to encompass a membership of around 200, and earned 4.7% of the Kommunalwahl (local election) with more than 16,000 people voting for their candidates (Kölner Statistische Nachrichten 2004). 5 years later, Pro-Köln gained further support in the electorate, climbing 0.7% in the 2009 Kommunalwahl to 5.4% (Kölner Statistische Nachrichten 2009: 5, see Figure 2.). This improvement is seen by many as a success, and according to Michael Trube of the Mobile Beratung gegen Rechtsextremismus Berlin (MBR), even though their base was not that big, "they successfully installed themselves as a longer lasting party in the city" (2011). Pro-Köln's agenda and program was quickly outsourced to neighboring regions where some people felt sympathetic to the group's message. In 2005, the movement already began calling itself a Bürgerbewegung (peoples' movement) and in a larger sense, as Pro-Deutschland, using the model of Pro-Köln to spread ideology (Häusler/ Peters 2008: 14). Two years later, Pro-Köln consolidated its power under the title of Pro-NRW as a way to convey a feeling of growth within the movement encompassing North Rhein-Westfalia (Häusler/ Peters 2008: 18). Shortly thereafter, the 'Pro' Bürgerbewegung appeared in Berlin, as well other cities throughout the country.

Structurally, the various 'Pro' movements are uniform with one another. Where the Tea Party exists in a multitude of settings, incorporating a wide breadth of right-wing ideology, from the social to the fiscal, the 'Pro' movements are more or less concerned with one set of problems, allowing them to be more uniform in its presentation. The focus on anti-Islamisierung or the struggle against what they see as impending take-over by Islamic persuasion is the cornerstone of their movement, and therefore certain images (i.e. mosques with red a line across them) are immediately associated with them. This is not necessarily the case with other images of right-wing ideology because they are not included in the 'Pro' movement dialogue, such as elimination of taxes and

strong belief in capitalism, as is the case with the Tea Party. In keeping with with this theme, all the various 'Pro' factions are very much in tune. In the recent elections in Berlin, for instance, Pro-Berlin had almost the same program Pro-NRW had for its own elections. Indeed, the reproduction of the Pro-Köln (and later as the Pro-NRW) model is as intentional as it is tactical. As Häusler and Peters explain:

„Die Gründung von PRO [Deutschland] und PRO NRW stellt den Versuch dar, das Modell der extrem rechten Gruppierung PRO KÖLN auf andere Städte zu übertragen. [...] Dieses rechtspopulistische Vorgehen unter dem Deckmantel einer „Bürgerbewegung" stellt eine neue Methode dar, um von Rechtsaußen an Einfluss zu gewinnen. Das Schüren von Ängsten und Vorurteilen gegenüber ‚dem Islam' steht dabei im Zentrum rechtspopulistischer Agitation." (Häusler/ Peters 2008: 2)

The streamlining of the 'Pro' movement 'look' is further evident in their online strategies, where all the factions have nearly identical websites that include links to each other.

While the visual and programmatic structure is very much in lock step with the vision and policy put forth by the original Pro-NRW group, there is little hierarchical relationship among them (Trube 2011). The different 'Pro' movements are thus independent from the others and are free to generate policy that is not directly delivered from a centralized location. In this respect, while Pro-Berlin carries the same banner as Pro-NRW, it is not obliged to. This relationship also helps to explain how leadership within the movement is managed. In Pro-Köln, for instance, there were alleged personal differences among the leaders, which resulted in Manfred Rouhs' unexplained move to Berlin, as the head the of the Pro-Berlin party. For Rouhs, the move afforded him a palette upon which to lead without the encumbrance of authority. It is, however, clear that most policy for the movement is made by Pro-NRW.

At first glance the organizational make up of the Tea Party and Pro-Köln are rather different. Where the Tea Party lacks in structural and organizational uniformity, it is more successful in conveying an emotionally salient voice. The 'Pro' movements are certainly more recognizable, in terms of what they stand for, but it is exactly what they stand for that does not resonate with a large portion of the German citizenry. By all accounts, the Tea Party is an elusive entity, that is as unclear in policy as it is in popularity. Paradoxically, Pro-Köln and its offshoots are as unpopular as they are organized. The following chapters, will further explain how these two movements,

because of their glaring differences in organization and structure, as well as the environments in which they exist, are responsible for the relative differences in their success as they call out for similar demands on society, particularly in reaction to the construction of mosques.

3. Mosque Case Study

This chapter will put forth an analysis of two particular mosques, Park51 in New York, and the Zentralmoschee Köln in Cologne, which will parse out the differences in the individual cases where the reaction from the Tea Party and Pro-Köln had similar quality. The first section will chronicle the reaction of the Tea Party to the proposed construction of the Park51 community center throughout the summer of 2010 leading up to the November elections of that year. The following section will detail the process by which Pro-Köln reacted to the proposed construction of the mosque in Cologne. In both cases, not only were the right-wing populist reactions similar, but so too was their failure to prevent to the construction of these Islamic centers[9]. As will be made evident, expressed aims of ridding their respective countries of Islam is coalesced by using the image of a mosque as a controversy, not necessarily by succeeding in preventing a mosque from being built. Indeed, it is the existence of the mosque which provides necessary fodder for (certain parts of) these movements.

3.1 Park51

The Tea Party certainly receives its most scathing criticisms in its view of social policy. One particular area involves the Tea Party's tenuous relationship with Islam. This characteristic was highlighted in the summer of 2010, when controversy broke out over the building of an Islamic community center near the hallowed grounds of the World Trade Center. The demands put forth by the Tea Party decried the construction as a wider symbol of decreasing American values. The presence of Islam, they suggest, will destroy the foundation of an America built on Christianity. Even worse, a mosque so close ground zero, they claim, is not only invasive but a symbol of Islamic 'victory' in the West.

9 Park51 opened its doors September 21, 2011 and the Zentralmoschee Köln is still under construction, although was approved for planning August 28, 2008. See The Associated Press. (2011). Islamic Center Opens Its Doors Near Ground Zero. Retrieved October 2, 2011 from http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=140693172 and Jenkner, C. (2008). Controversial Cologne Construction – Go-Ahead for Germany's Biggest Mosque. Muslims in Germany Retrieved April 2, 2011, from http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,575170,00.html

The conservative outcry against the construction began as a small protest, but quickly became a national concern promulgated by Tea Party leaders. By the the height of that summer, protests against Park51 had transformed into an uproarious opposition of mosques in general. Indeed, across the nation, Tea Party rallies were routinely held in front of much smaller sites of Muslim prayer (Goodstein 2010), ultimately forgetting that the ignition of the controversy was over a community center, not a mosque. As Anushay Hossain writes, "This Community Center plans to house a culinary school, an auditorium, a swimming pool, a basketball court, and yes, space for prayer. But it is not a mosque, so we all need to stop calling it that" (2010). In the end, while the Tea Party's rhetoric was ineffective in preventing the construction of Park51, it was able to maintain enough popularity to win sweeping elections that following November.

Early protests against the demonized "9/11 mosque" were reported in May, 2010, when Tea Party "darling" Pamela Geller (Townsend, 2010), co-founder of Stop Islamization of America, began blogging about her concerns with the presence of an Islamic house of prayer close to the site of the fallen towers. Gellar is accredited as being instrumental in garnering attention to the issue:

"[...] mainstream media picked up on angst about Park51, the planned cultural center and mosque in lower Manhattan, only after Geller began blogging about it. In recent weeks, Geller has become a chief spokeswoman against the project, appearing on ABC's "Good Morning America," CNN, NBC Nightly News, and Fox." (Burke 2010)

Before long, the Tea Party, with Gellar and its most notable leaders like Sarah Palin and Newt Gingrich in the lead (Goodstein 2010; Wheaton 2010) were able to foment anger toward the construction, as evidenced by the swelling crowds of protesters and

the numerous death threats that Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf and his wife Daisy Khan received (Robinson 2010; Schroeck 2010). In the span of three months, the image of Park51 had been transformed from its initial intentions of being a site, "that strengthens ties between Muslims and people of all faiths and backgrounds" (Blumenthal 2009) to a site tarnished by right-wing populist claims that the mosque is a sign of Islamic celebration of victory against America. In attempts to curb growing resentment planners for the community center went so far as to change the proposed name from "Cordoba House" to Park51, so as to deflate possible anger about what such a name might mean, but to little avail.



What seemed like a minor triumph, reported by the New York Times, about the permission to begin construction on a building that was intended to bring a sense of healing and understanding to a neighborhood that had experienced a terrible event (Blumenthal 2009) became the Tea Party's cause célèbre against an 'imperialist' Islam. However, almost every qualm the protest had with the proposed site was either invalidated by fact or renounced by the constitution itself[10]. From the onset, classic right-wing populist tactics of garnering support through fear-based rhetoric was at play. As Joseph Heathcott argues:

"The recently ginned-up controversy over the Park 51 Muslim Community Center in Lower Manhattan (aka "Ground Zero Mosque") follows the same well-worn script. Right-wing strategists—and their close allies in the Republican Party and Fox News—generate, and then report on, fear-driven "issues" grounded in very little fact and a great deal of hearsay, ad hominem, and speculation. These specific issues then spin

10 The First Amendment states that, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof" U. S. Constitution. Amendment I ("Congress shall make no law respecting…").

into generalized anger over the supposed loss of pre-eminence of white Anglo-Saxon Protestant culture." (Heathcott 2011: 40)

The claim that Park51 was being constructed as a "victory mosque" was repudiated countless times by Rauf, whose own record not only puts him in close ties with the FBI, where he gave speeches and conducted trainings after the 9/11 attacks (Tirella/ Diaz 2010) but personally stated that the intention of Park51 was to, "push back against the extremists" (Blumenthal 2009). Additionally, Tea Party claims that funding for the project came from dubious sources and demands that an investigation be taken place were ultimately ruled as unfounded although the investors were eventually disclosed by Rauf (Fung 2010).

Further implications of the Tea Party included rhetoric that the construction of the "mosque" in that place was somehow a slap in the face of those Americans who suffered through the events of 9/11. This sentiment was thrust into talking points across many media outlets after Sarah Palin posted messages to Twitter that, "called on "peaceful Muslims" to "refudiate [sic]" mosque plans [...] Ground Zero mosque is UNNECESSARY provocation; it stabs hearts. Pls reject it in interest of healing" (Wheaton 2010). The argument seemed to be that the planned construction site was simply too close to where the Twin Towers once stood, and that somehow the nearness of the building was insensitive. What was not taken into account by proponents of this idea, however, was the fact that not only is the site of Park51 not technically at Ground Zero, but that there are several other houses of prayer that are closer than Park51 to Ground Zero (see figure 3) and two mosques, though not closer than Park51, have existed in the area for many years without incident (Barnard 2010; Media Matters For America 2010b).

What is elucidated by these facts is not merely deep seated hypocrisy on the part of these protests, but speaks to a broader narrative of racist and xenophobic sentiment that is alive and well in America. It is clear that the Tea Party's demands are designed to exploit fears of cultural pluralism and tap into visceral emotional reactions from many average middle class Americans. Railing against Park51 with all its flimsy and unsupported claims is rather a tactic that aims to invoke a sense of anger within people, rather than at a system that has failed to provide.

The age old story once again comes to mind of love thy neighbor hate thy enemy. It is replayed in every plot, in numerous ways. In this particular story the fellow American

is your neighbor, and the Muslim is your enemy, not because you have been treated badly by this Muslim but because you have been taught by Sarah Palin and the Tea Party that s/he is bad, and this feeling must be reciprocated (Sullivan 1996: 93). Americans sympathetic to the Tea Party's social policies are enamored by the movement's ability to lay out America's problems by, "deflecting their attention away from the institutions that truly rule their lives and onto scapegoats" (Heathcott 2011: 41). It is the extreme right, manifested as the Tea party movement and its current populist nature, part and parcel of prejudiced attitudes, that is leading the charge against Muslim rights and foreigners in general. The protest against Park51 is an expression of right-wing populism at its finest.

3.2 Zentralmoschee Köln

Pro-Köln was formed as a political party solely around the construction of the Zentralmoschee Köln in Cologne. The mosque, which will be the biggest in the country, no doubt represents a growing presence of Islam in Germany and broader Europe. For Pro-Köln, however, the presence of Islam, symbolized by the mosque, is a grave threat



Figure 4: Omniquest 2007

to the foundation of European values (Bodissey 2009b). Indeed, much like the Tea Party, Pro-Köln's aim is to stop the Islamisierung of Germany and has built its platform as a political party around the idea that Islam is trying to overthrow the tenets of Europe. In a promotional video for the "Anti-Islamization Conference", Pro-Köln lays down its position on Islam quite clearly:

"Today we find the symbols of Islamic power erected in all former Christian villages. But this isn't enough to meet the demands for submission from this political-religion. The latest target: the cities of western Europe, among them Cologne" (Translated by Piggy Infidel in Bodissey 2009b; Pro-Köln 2009a).

The rhetoric, much like the Tea Party, is again, very much in line with populist tactics. Accordingly, Pro-Köln's message is expounded through fear-mongering, attempting to link the presence of Islam in Germany with the perceived social problems many working class Germans are experiencing.

The Zentralmoschee Köln, like Park51, has been approved by the city council of Cologne, and is slated to open early 2012 (Abbany 2011). Similarly, the protests were wholly unsuccessful in stopping the project, which were arguably as unsubstantiated as the Tea Party claims. While Pro-Köln remains whole heartedly committed to the idea that Islam, in all its forms, is planning to somehow overthrow Europe from within, they lack any strong support for their cause other than visceral and emotional. To be sure, the party did gain in popularity as a result of their canvassing on the issue, but according to a poll conducted of 500 Cologne dwellers, a majority of them thought the mosque had a right to be built (Omniquest 2007; see figure 4). Certainly the size of the survey puts into question the soundness of the results, especially considering the relatively high numbers of "nein" answers[11] especially considering the platform of Pro-Köln in relation to the percentage of votes it received in the local elections.

The mosque itself, separate from the claims of Pro-Köln, came under scores of criticism during its planning phase. While many believed the Muslims had a right to build a mosque, fewer believed the plans presented to the city council should be approved (Omniquest 2007). Hesitation to accept the plans were located in technical

11 Though the New York Times reported in a correction that, "The sample of 500 people was sufficient for a scientific poll; that sample was not "small," nor did its size limit the poll's "usefulness as a gauge of popular sentiment in a city of one million."" See Landler, M. (2007). Germans Split Over a Mosque and the Role of Islam Europe Retrieved April 13, 2011, from http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/05/world/europe/05cologne.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all

reasoning; the size was too big; the area was inappropriate; the planning did not include enough community involvement. In the nearby city of Duisburg, a similar (though not as big) mosque was built with relative ease and blessings from the community. As Emily Harris reports, there was, "no divisive debate there because German politicians, church and community leaders were invited to advise the project early on" (2007) whereas in Cologne, much of the planning was kept out of sight from public scrutiny though within the bounds of the law. However, for DITIB, the organization ultimately funding and organizing the construction, the criticism is erroneous since for them the construction of the mosque is simply a modernization of an already existing mosque. According to Sadi Arlsan the president of DITIB, "there is some prejudice [...] and lack of information" (Harris 2007). Overall, the arguments that DITIB should have included community involvement in the planning is moot point. In fact, according to German law, "Urban planning law takes into account the religious needs of the local population and the views of religious associations have to be heard in order to establish the [site] for constructing places of worship" (Robbers 2009). In cases of mosques, the call to prayer is also agreed upon by the community, in terms of what volume is appropriate. Indeed, the German constitution protects the right to use the call to prayer and loudspeakers as a part of the free practice of religion (Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland; Robbers 2009). Perhaps it was the degree or level at which the community was involved that angered some, but the point remains that DITIB was at no legal fault.

As stated previously, in both cases, Park51 and Zentralmoschee Köln were approved and built or are under construction with little to no question in the eyes of the legal system. They were planned and funded under appropriate measures and did nothing to arouse suspicion. Yet, in both cases, a great debate was stirred, attracting questioning by-standers and a news frenzy. While there was nothing evident to claim mischief on the part of the Muslim community attempting to establish a house of prayer for themselves, the tendency for the protesters, particularly in these two cases, seem to concern mainly with turgid smoke screens. Non-issues of 'nearness to Ground Zero' and 'amount of community participation in planning' dominate the discussion and further help to substantiate the movements that are battling against Islamic presence. In the following chapter, a close examination the Tea Party and Pro-Köln's right-wing populist characteristics will show how these 'non-issue' tactics are not only deliberate but is indeed an integral method of garnering support. The chapter will mainly focus on

the successes of the Tea Party and failures of Pro-Köln through various criteria. While it shall present a clear understanding of how the American environment is more receptive to this type of movement than Germany, it will also further clarify the various standards by which to gauge the function of contemporary right-wing populism.

4. Successes and Failures

How right-wing populist parties and movements, like the Tea Party and Pro-Köln, gain support in elections shall be the emphasis in this chapter. By analyzing how each movement fared in a variety of fields, we can approximate a level of success necessary for a movement to gain popular footing in the national political sphere. By examining media sources, blogs and personal accounts, this chapter will look at five qualitative indicators (see figure 5), informed by Frank Decker (2008), that help explain the favorable or unfavorable outcome for right-wing populist movements, and allow us to understand how the successes of the Tea Party are different from the only moderate successes of Pro-Köln/NRW. These criteria are: media representation, leadership, agency capability, political maneuverability, and historical conditions.

4.1 Media representation

Tea Party	Qualitative indicators	Pro-Köln
Somewhat positive	Media representation	Somewhat negative
Charismatic	Leadership	Non-charismatic
High	Agency capability	Limited
High	Political maneuverability	Limited
Little burden	Historical conditions	Encumbered

Figure 5

Media representation is enormously important for any right-wing populist movement. The ability to present one's platform in front of a camera or in the pages of a

newspaper is invaluable to the spreading and proliferation of a message. Securing a spot within the media, however, is not necessarily an easy task. Often, mass media outlets tend to ignore social movements, either for ideological reasons or for the mere lack of attraction to the cause. This partially explains the often crass positions of protesters we see on the nightly news. For social movements then, the objective becomes one of creating a voice that not only resonates with its base, but is loud enough to attract the reporters. "The task of translating the chronic problem as described by the critical community into an acute problem that will attract media attention is the province of social and political movements" (Rochon, as quoted in Porta/ Diani 2006b). Accordingly, the fixation on seemingly ridiculous objections (i.e. the distance of Park51 from Ground Zero or the lack of community input in the construction of Zentralmoschee Köln) can be understood as a tactic to attract attention to the cause rather than genuine qualms with that particular sentiment. The actual sentiment, rather, is located in a greater space of discourse, for example, against the general presence of foreigners in the nation, or more specifically, of Muslims in America and Germany.

Additional forms of media are also becoming an important staple for social movements, particularly of movements that are too radical for established media outlets to cover. This is certainly the case for Pro-Köln who is largely ignored by the media for having far too extreme policies. The 'Pro' movement thus relies on a network of websites and social media in order to circulate their message. The ability for a movement to diversify its media coverage is key, particularly when that group's message is of a certain extremist tone. As Porta and Diani argue, "Pluralism of the mass media and the richness of meso-level media emerge as important conditions for the spread of movement messages" (2006a). Consequently, the movement, in its creation of online networks, has established its own news publications and video libraries (see "www.pro Koeln.tv" in Pro-Köln 2009c) by which to disseminate their otherwise unheard viewpoints.

Another way for right-wing populist movements, in particular Pro-Köln, to receive airtime is by being elected to parliamentary seats, even at the lowest levels. In this way, media outlets can no longer ignore them, since they are a part of the functioning political process. In Germany, public broadcasters are legally required to give all members of Parliament time on the air (Decker 2008: 124). In this way, populist

movements can use low level electoral victories to boost their presence on mass media coverage.

For the Tea Party, airtime on major news networks is of little challenge. Networks like Fox News and major publications like the New York Post have tended to place the movement in favorable light. In a review of 19 articles from July and August 2010, only five portrayed the Tea Party in unfavorably (see appendix 1). Fox News is unquestionably biased toward the Tea Party and is certainly the source of news for Tea Party supporters themselves as evidenced in a CBS/New York Times poll that shows Tea Party supporters overwhelmingly watch the channel over other choices (Ashbee 2011: 157; Heathcott 2011: 40; see appendix 2).

Already, there is a major difference between the way media treats these two movements. We can deduce from the readings and observation that the Tea Party is, in relation to Pro-Köln, far more positively portrayed in the media. Though we are comparing across two separate systems, where media coverage may be conducted on completely different levels, the point remains; Pro-Köln's mainstream representation in media is almost non-existent, subsisting rather, in blogs and online platforms. The Tea Party, on the other hand, is largely coddled by mass media like Fox News, New York Post and others as mentioned previously, and as a result, is able to broadcast its objectives to a wider and more sympathetic audience.

4.2 Leadership

For right-wing populism, as in any movement, leadership is key. In fact, for Frank Decker, "The most conspicuous formal [characteristic] of right-wing populist parties are that they [...] rely on charismatic leadership" (Decker 2008: 123, italics mine). Populist parties envision democracy that is 'people-centric' and charismatic leadership corresponds with this idea of simple and direct political institutions (Jan 2006: 245). It is therefore integral and necessary for populist parties to have capable leaders, who can speak clearly and colloquially to the people. Often this reflected in speech and attire that shows how they are part of 'the people' but retain unique qualities that set them aside as the savior of the nation and its citizens (Albertazzi/ McDonnell 2008: 5; Canovan 1999: 6).

The Tea Party has many revered figures, that are all shopped around news cycles as the influential leader. Michele Bachmann, Rand Paul, and Marco Rubio are among the

newly elected Congress members who ran as Tea Party champions (see appendix 4 & 5). Of course, there are Paul Ryan, John Boehner, presidential hopeful and intellectual father of the Tea Party Ron Paul, and, outside the elected position is Glenn Beck, acting as a quasi evangelical voice as a Fox News and talk radio host, and the "Mama Grizzly" Sarah Palin, among others, who are all seen as charismatic leaders. While there is no singular person leading the charge for the movement, as is common for populist parties, the Tea Party has been able to supplement the lack of centralized guidance under a leader by employing other tactics, like highly capable agency, which will be discussed shortly. Regardless, however, these figures either have the youth and vigor or the gravitas and appearance to energize their base.

For Pro-Köln, leadership has been an enduring problem. This is not to say that they lack leadership. In fact, many of their leaders are intelligent and capable people but lack in certain appearance and unity. Markus Beisicht, for example, is the current president of the party, and while he is very eloquent and thoughtful, his political framework is derived from some very worrisome places (Trube 2011). As a student of law, he was highly involved in circles of particularly questionable backgrounds, including the "Ring Freiheitlicher Studenten" which was founded by members of the far-right Cologne fraternity "Germania." The "Ring Freiheitlicher Studenten" is an exclusive organization who keeps company with very far-right notables, like Klaus Klunze, a lawyer who defends neo-nazis today. Additionally, Beisicht is a former member of the "Republikaner", another far-right party, and in 1991 founded his own party the "Deutsche Liga für Volk und Heimat" which gained moderate attention until the formation of Pro-Köln (Häusler/ Peters 2008: 22) where he has been since.

The past ties of these leaders is immensely important in assessing how successful they will be in garnering support for their cause. In Germany, in particular, historical rationale plays a large part in the decision process of German voters, as will be discussed later in this chapter. Indeed, for much of the leadership in Pro-Köln, past connections with far-right or even neo-nazi groups is a major hindrance to their success as leaders. This certainly also includes Manfred Rouhs, along with other 'Pro' party leaders Judith Wolter, Markus Wiener, and Heinz Kurt Täubner (see Köln ganz rechts).

4.3 Agency capability

The ability of leadership in right-wing populist movements to put forth meaningful and coherent goals lies in the faculty of agency. The intervention of right-wing ideology into the mainstream discourse is obviously an important goal, and can only done if the leadership possesses the right tools to do so. This does not simply imply that leadership must be charismatic, but rather, that they are well connected to influential institutes and other parties (Albertazzi/ McDonnell 2008: 10).

The Tea Party's success is largely a result of its ties with organizations outside the Tea Party itself. As alluded to in previous chapters, the Tea Party is well connected with lobbyists, PACs, corporations and news outlets. In fact, the Tea Party agency is so well supported, that charismatic leadership can be considered a front to the wheelings and dealings of back-room meetings. To clarify, populist parties of all types pride themselves in putting forth candidates that carry an air of the 'homely average Joe', the outsider to the establishment. Traditionally, these are just façades for people who actually have substantial history in elitist positions, who do indeed have experience in politics. However, the Tea Party has started a trend of endorsing candidates that actually have little experience in the formal political system (Ashbee 2011: 158). As Michael Gerson explains:

"In Tea Party theory, inexperience is itself seen as a kind of qualification. [...] People like [Tea Party candidate] O'Donnell are actually preferable to people like [Karl Rove], because they haven't been tainted by public trust or actual achievement." (Gerson quoted in Ashbee 2011: 158).

As a result, the Tea Party may actually elect these types of candidates, who then enter the system with little knowledge of how matters run. This, however, is of little consequence since the endorsement of these candidates means heavy support from organizations that shape policy for them anyways. Again, as detailed previously, groups like FreedomWorks, run by Washington insiders, actively endorse and create platforms for the Tea Party and its candidates, allowing them to focus more on image than experience. Additionally, certain connections made through agency give easier access to media outlets. In this regard, the capability of Tea Party agency is high, in that its relationship with influential organizations allows them not only political and financial support, but also important airtime.

In Cologne, once again the story is quite different. The rather extreme views of the movement cast them aside as outliers in the political arena, alienating them from important relationships within the system. The agency of Pro-Köln exists mainly in its ties with other right-wing parties in the country and abroad. The narrow scope of their agenda also contributes to their political isolation and limited capability of agency. Since Pro-Köln focuses primarily on the Islamization of Germany, it loses possible opportunities to forge relationship with other right-wing organizations that focus their energy in other areas. In the case of the Tea Party, most of their connections to supporting organizations come from an alignment in fiscal and economic thinking, a stance Pro-Köln does not articulate or convey coherently.

In a sense, its limited agency has afforded Pro-Köln with relationships only further to its right. However, these relationships have resulted in some very interesting organizational peculiarities for right-wing populist groups that generally hold onto very rigid concepts of nationalism. For example, on May 7, 2011, the party organized the "Marsch für die Freiheit" which was attended by representatives from numerous right-wing populist groups throughout the West, including the Tea Party (Diener/ Öztürker 2011). This event symbolizes a curious shift in the classic ideology of right-wing populists in Germany, who traditionally held highly nationalistic views that were resistant to outside groups. Furthermore, Pro-Köln is openly supportive of Israel and its attempts to shut down Islamic presence in the country, a characteristic very unfamiliar in German right-wing populism (Bodissey 2009a; Trube 2011). In the end, however, these connections have done little to increase support.

4.4 Political maneuverability

The ease at which political movements, of one particular ilk or another, can form and organize within a political system is another gauge we must measure in order to fully understand right-wing populism. Hindrances to the organization by institutional conditions reflects the effort by which these parties and movements have to give in order to carry out their goals. As Decker explains, "[political institutions] influence the competitive balance between parties and, hence, the scope for newcomers to make a breakthrough at the polls and/or gain a foothold in Parliament" (Decker 2008: 124).

In Germany, the political party system of proportional representation, which is characteristically pluralistic, is relatively open to the formation of new parties, in the sense that many simply exist. However, most of these parties are not integrated into

the system because they fail to obtain a minimum of five percent of the vote in Parliament. Decker expounds:

"Parliamentary representation is important, because it gives outsiders the media coverage that is indispensable in order to achieve sustained electoral success, not least because public broadcasters are legally required to provide representatives of all parliamentary parties with airtime to speak in pre- election broadcasts. In terms of electoral campaigning and public funding too, challengers in Germany are not unduly handicapped." (Decker 2008: 124)

For obvious reasons, then, new political parties strive to reach the five percent threshold, in order to sustain themselves as a legitimate voice in the so-called representative democracy. However, this is mostly only achieved on the local level, because certain structural hindrances within the federal government tend to dissuade parties from pursuing higher office. This in part, due to the fact that most populist parties receive protest votes in regional elections. The electorate, however, is less likely to protest vote in federal elections because there is less incentive to do so after protest votes have already been cast in regional elections (Decker 2008: 124).

Pro-Köln, even though it is already established as political party and did receive over five percent of the vote, remains only a minor player in North Rhein-Westphalia. In Berlin, the 'Pro' movement did not come close to reaching the five percent mark, and in national German elections, the prospects are even lower.

For the United States, party structuring is far more difficult than in Germany in terms of creating a new political party. However, because the Tea Party is not a political party but rather a *movement* giving wind to certain factions of the Republican Party, it is able to assume the political maneuverability possessed by those cohorts within the GOP. This suggests that the Tea Party, in comparison to *Pro-Köln*, has a much easier time navigating institutional structures that otherwise would impede movement. This claim is supported by the fact that all Tea Party candidates that were elected in the November 2010 elections, either for the House of Representatives or the Senate, is a registered Republican, implying that Tea Party ideology is simply a brand of Republicanism, that is supported by a popular social movement. To be sure, without the support of parts of the Republican base, the Tea Party would have a much more difficult time accomplishing goals.

4.5 Historical conditions

In the unique case of right-wing populism, historical conditions can play a large role in understanding the success of the movement or party. Germany certainly has a long and deplorable past with right-wing populism in the form of National Socialism (Decker 2008: 125; Karapin 1998: 225). Memories of the Holocaust and the Second World War are always present in the minds of many Germans, and is certainly reflected in the polls. In almost every vein of organization, successful parties are careful to distance themselves from the likes of neo-nazis and the general tone of that history. Apart from the social implications of the historical burden, Germany also has in place legal conditions which prohibits 'militant democracy' (Decker 2008: 125).

Furthermore, German extremist parties continually suffer from the infiltration of former neo-nazis or neo-nazi sympathizers, who perpetuate the stigmatization of these groups. Right-wing parties in Germany must, therefore, be very careful about attracting membership from the far-right (Kitschelt/ McGann, as quoted in Decker 2008). Pro-Köln has made an attempt to appear like it is free from this burden[12] (Trube 2011), however, opposition to the 'Pro' movement has remained steadfast in revealing the party's various links to the NPD and other far-right organizations (see Köln ganz rechts).

The historical burden is so great on the German right-wing, that extremist parties have the lowest popularity among any other right-wing group in Europe (Decker 2008: 125). Indeed, many experts agree that because this fact is so pervasive, it explains why all right-wing populist parties in postwar Germany have been wholly unsuccessful.

The historical encumbrance that exists in Germany is absent in the American political system. While regrettable actions on the part of the American government in the past and present do exist, nothing compares to the atrocities of the National Socialist experiment of the 30s and 40s. Consequently, there is more room for the rise of right-wing populist groups in the American context. Arguably, the stigma of Naziism exists in the US as well, but the brand of Naziism against a certain person or group simply means less than in Germany.

12 This might help to explain why Manfred Rouhs left the leadership of Pro-Köln.

To be sure, Naziism is not a popular sentiment in the US, but its presence does exist in the form of white supremacist groups throughout the country. Concomitantly, there are groups that form around exclusionary viewpoints, not unlike National Socialism, but are, in every respect, not Nazis. The Tea Party, for example is certainly not informed by nazi ideals, and in the few cases where ties were made, little has come of it. Perhaps it is the cultural distance Americans have from the National Socialist era that makes them less worried about prejudiced platforms, or simply the lack of any historical atrocity that works to shape the conscience of voters, the fact remains that Americans are less affected by historical encumbrances than Germans.

4.6 Explanations

This chapter seeks to examine various indicators that help us to understand how Pro-Köln fares in comparison to the Tea Party as a right-wing populist group. In every gauge of analysis, the Tea Party has had a distinct advantage, with the slight exception of media representation. Media representation, though still very limited, has been one of mark moderate success for Pro-Köln, not only because the party gained enough votes to legally provide them with airtime, but because of their utilization of independent sources of media. To be sure though, the quality of leadership and the capabilities of that agency, political structuring and the ease at which creating new political formations happens within governmental structures and within society, and the role of historical conditions have all served either to the disadvantage of Pro-Köln or to the advantage of the Tea Party.

For Pro-Köln, the most pervasive factor inhibiting it in all criteria is the historical encumbrance of the Holocaust. Because of its loose affiliations with certain organizations, the acquiring of substantial exposure in the media, the strengthening of its agency by opening up relationships with mainstream support systems, and the social and legal implications those ties, together with this historical burden, have on a political system designed to curb the fomentation of extreme right ideology, Pro-Köln simply cannot compete with the success of the Tea Party, though their views, in terms of Islamization, are very similar.

In attempting to gain airtime on news media outlets, the 'Pro' movement has had to resort to independent forms of media, like social networking and blogging, which simply do not compare to the daily support from news giants like Fox News that the Tea Party receives. However, due to relative electoral success in 2009, Pro-Köln

reached the five percent threshold, suggesting to many, that the party was becoming a more substantial party in the region. The mild success, in this regard, suggests the party is making inroads in the established political landscape, by growing its limited media resources. Outside North Rhein-Westphalia, however, the movement is not yet seen with such growing popularity.

Of course, leadership in the party has a direct connection to this historical aspect since many of them keep or have kept company with people and organizations that actively promote the ideals that have created this enduring burden for them. Similarly, the ability of leadership to access important tools for disseminating their ideology is at once cut down by their well-known biographies; a condition Tea Party leaders do not have to worry about. This historical burden also largely influences the political maneuverability, in that the system (stated in the Constitution) is structured to keep alive the memory of National Socialism as something never to be repeated again. This is translated into precaution about all extreme right-wing groups. Again, the Tea Party is free from this, since it plays the part of a guiding voice for parts of the GOP, one of the two strongest political parties in the country. Accordingly, it enjoys the support of well connected organizations, allowing it the ability to function relatively unencumbered by lack of exposure.

In summation, the major explanation for the success of the Tea Party can be accredited to its propped up support, through 'astroturfing', while Pro-Köln can be seen as a failure because of certain overwhelmingly pervasive historical conditions.

5. Conclusion

The Tea Party's message seems to resonate louder with Americans than that of Pro-Köln's message with the Germans, even when considering that this particular brand of right-wing movement, that establishes anti-Islamization as a major part of its platform, has increased in numbers throughout the entirety of the western world. The Tea Party, on all accounts, is more successful than Pro-Köln in conveying a stance that is exclusionary toward Muslims because it simply does not have the historical burden of the Holocaust, or anything similar, to stigmatize its social policies regarding the presence of Islam in America. It also conveys its messages better than the 'Pro' movement because it is stacked with the power and might of the Republican Party and organizations that have remarkable sway in the political process. Though not all

Republicans are Tea Party sympathizers, it is evident that major conservative organizations have funded the movement, trained its leaders, and provided an outlet for media representation in the form of Fox News. Pro-Köln simply does not have that support, and it is owed to the fact that they themselves are merely 'right-wing extremists' in Germany, a label that has historically inhibited them in the country. This difference is laid out previously as a distinction between the grassroots organization of Pro-Köln and the 'astroturfed' Tea Party.

Earlier in this work, I put forward the idea of 'post-neo right-wing movements' as a way to describe a new trend of exclusionary populism in Germany and wider Europe. This term attempts to differentiate the 'new right-wing populism' of the past, characterized by complete failure and odorous antisemitism, from groups like Pro-Köln/NRW who have attempted to change their tune by becoming openly sympathetic to the Jewish struggle, and have not been marred by complete failure, due to their moderate success in regional elections. The term, in light of this body of work, is specific to the rash of right-wing populism, driven by a particular brand of nationalism that locates its purpose in the eradication of Islam. It is this detail that distinguishes these groups from its predecessors, and deserves a specific lens. If nothing else, it is a call to view these movements with more caution, since they are distinctly different.

Indeed, simply writing the threat of *Pro-Köln* off as a 'failure' in comparison to the Tea Party, and as a 'historically proven fact' that all extreme right-wing movements in Germany are bound to lose, is a disservice. Anybody who follows the Tea Party, knows that it contains within it, a certain inertia that is rare among movements, but that is not to say other forms of right-wing populism should be ignored, particularly nowadays. Indeed, *Pro-Köln,* while not nearly as popular as the Tea Party, represents a movement that is slowly gaining momentum. Though it is gaining traction only in certain areas and only in small increments, it is learning from the failures of the past. It understands the historical encumbrance it faces, and it is attempting to rebrand itself. *Pro-Köln* and its parent, *Pro-NRW,* has attempted to spread a new image of itself that says, "look at us, we're different from those Fascists." We see this in its attempts to allay ideas of Naziism within its ranks and within its policies. The movement proudly supports Israel, advertises its Jewish support, and allegedly makes a distinct effort to purge its membership (including its leadership) of ties with neo-nazis; a policy that no other right-wing populist party has attempted in the past.

Certainly, the comparison of Pro-Köln to the Tea Party masks its small yet remarkable success in Germany's fourth-largest city. It is certainly not my intention to hide this creeping anti-Islamic sentiment. To the contrary, it is my wish that this exercise in comparison, not only affords readers the opportunity to reevaluate possible feelings of benevolence toward the Tea Party, to provide certain insight in how the German population might be assessing the Tea Party, but also to illuminate the regrowth of prejudice in Europe in the form of anti-Islamic sentiment and keep the dialogue of an open and ethical society alive and well, so as to combat the bigotry that informs such movements.

Indeed, it is the duty of a moral and ethic society to maintain the struggle for Utopian life. A small project, building this path, is ensuring that exclusionary viewpoints have no room to grow. We can only do this by remaining diligent in exposing them within society, by examining their presence and critically questioning their presence. To be sure, a simple relabeling of these groups alone is not enough, but it is a start. We must reevaluate the conditions that created a necessity to relabel these groups in the first place. Contemporary post-scarcity societies that produce prejudiced feelings are sick and only until we push to accept a moral, productive economy, with emphasis on community, can we expect it to get better. We must demand a society couched in a "naturalistic outlook, [with an] emphasis on discipline with freedom and responsibility with imagination" (Bookchin, 2001; pp. 4) over current conditions marred by the abscess of obsessive materialism and wealth, individualized success, and unattainable status, creating impotence and rage, the foundation of exclusionary feelings that is so prevalent today; only then are extreme right-wing populists parties and movements, characterized by these feelings, bound to lose.

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Appendix 1: New York Post Articles (July/ August 2010)

*Articles that contain significant comments about the Tea Party

Source: NYPost.com

Articles*	Favorable towards Tea Party	Unfavorable toward Tea Party
Who can capture the Tea Party vote?	√	
Tea Party boots big		√
NAACP shows its ugly side	√	
The racist rules of O's Justice Dept.	√	
Dems migrating into elex danger	√	
Lazio's two 'dead'lines	√	
Angle says campaign to defeat Reid God's 'calling'	√	
Andy, rivals in mosque split	√	
Busy weekend for veep Biden	√	
Happily ridiculous	√	
McCain beats Tea Party fave		√
Beck and call	√	
Penny prankster's dirty-tricks campaign		√

Articles*	Favorable towards Tea Party	Unfavorable toward Tea Party
The Dems' deficit-hawk fakery	√	
Cuomo's camp likes kook Carl		√
Beck: US has 'wandered in darkness'	√	
Nancy's nefarious conspiracy theory	√	
Gov. hopeful Paladino: House poor in prison dorms		√

Appendix 2: CBS New/New York Times Poll (April 5-12 2010)

The Tea Party Movement: Who are They

q95 Which one of the following television networks do you watch most for information about politics and current events -- ABC, CBS,NBC, CNN, FOXNews Channel, MSNBC, or don't you watch television news?

Total Respondents

	Total %	Tea Party Supporter %
ABC, CBS, NBC	26	11
CNN	17	7
Fox New Channel	23	63
MSNBC	3	1
Don’t watch news	16	6
Other	3	1

	Total %	Tea Party Supporter %
Combination (vol.)	11	10
DK/NA	1	1

Appendix 3: List of Conservative House Wins (November 2010)

*All Representatives in this table are Republican

**Has been endorsed by a Tea Party organization

Source: Tea Party Express (2010), FreedomWorks (2010)

Representative*	Incumbent	Tea Party**
Adams	No	√
Bachmann	Yes	√
Barletta	No	√
Bass	No	√
Benishek	No	√
Berg	No	√
Black	No	
Brooks	No	
Bucshon	No	
Buerkle	No	√
Canseco	No	
Chabot	No	√
Cravaack	No	√
Crawford	No	√
Dent	Yes	√
DesJarlais	No	√
Dold	No	√
Duffy	No	√
Ellmers	No	√
Farenthold	No	√

Representative*	Incumbent	Tea Party**
Fincher	No	
Fitzpatrick	No	√
Flores	No	√
Gardner	No	√
Gerlach	Yes	√
Gibbs	No	√
Gibson	No	√
Gosar	No	√
Griffin	No	√
Griffith	No	√
Grimm	No	√
Guinta	No	√
Hanna	No	
Harris	No	
Hartzler	No	
Hayworth	No	
Heck	No	√
Herrera	No	√
Hultgren	No	√
Hurt	No	
Johnson	No	√
Kelly	No	√
Kinzinger	No	√
Labrador	No	√
Landry	No	√
Lungren	Yes	√
Marino	No	√
McKinley	No	√
Meehan	No	√
Mulvaney	No	√
Noem	No	√
Nunnelee	No	
Palazzo	No	

Representative*	Incumbent	Tea Party**
Pearce	No	√
Quayle	No	√
Reed	No	
Reichert	Yes	
Renacci	No	√
Ribble	No	√
Rigell	No	
Rivera	No	
Roby	No	
Ross	No	
Runyan	No	√
Schilling	No	√
Schweikert	No	√
Scott	No	
Southerland	No	√
Stivers	No	√
Terry	Yes	√
Tipton	No	√
Toberi	Yes	√
Walberg	No	√
Walsh	No	√
Webster	No	
West	No	√
Yoder	No	√
Young	No	√

Appendix 4: List of Conservative Senate Wins (November 2010)

*All Senators in this table are Republican

**Has been endorsed by a Tea Party organization

Source: Tea Party Express (2010), FreedomWorks (2010)

Senator*	Incumbent	Tea Party**
Chuck Grassley	Yes	
Dan Coats	No	
David Vitter	Yes	
Jerry Moran	No	√
Jim DeMint	Yes	√
John Boozman	No	√
John Hoeven	No	√
John McCain	Yes	
John Thune	Yes	√
Johnny Isakson	Yes	
Kelly Ayotte	No	
Lisa Murkowski	Yes	
Marco Rubio	No	√
Mark Kirk	No	
Mike Crapo	Yes	√
Mike Lee	No	√
Pat Toomey	No	√
Rand Paul	No	√
Richard Burr	Yes	
Richard Shelby	Yes	
Rob Portman	No	
Ron Johnson	No	√

Senator*	Incumbent	Tea Party**
Roy Blunt	No	
Tom Coburn	Yes	√

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